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Certification organisations have become important players in the monitoring 
of compliance with social and environmental standards. This is particularly 
the case in relation to corporate operators producing in or sourcing from 
developing countries. At the same time, some of the worst industrial disasters 
in recent years, such as the Ali Enterprises factory fire in Pakistan or the 
collapse of the Rana Plaza building in Bangladesh, occurred after the 
relevant operators had been certified for their compliance with standards. 
This raised doubts about the care that the relevant certification organisation 
had exercised. This article explores potential grounds on which corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) certification organisations may incur liability 
towards third parties, in particular employees of subsidiaries or suppliers. 
To this end, it discusses the functions of certification generally before it 
analyses the potential liability of certification bodies under German and 
English law. It considers various circumstances under which certification 
takes place, including certification that is required by law, certification that 
is required to obtain certain benefits, such as tax reductions, certification 
within private CSR schemes and the entirely voluntary use of CSR 
certification as an instrument of supply chain control. 
I INTRODUCTION 
As a result of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) debate, and with the 
increasing risk of parent companies having to assume liability for the operations 
of their subsidiaries or even suppliers, the corporate governance of such 
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structures and the monitoring of supplier compliance with certain standards 
have become crucial. That task is often outsourced to specialised organisations 
that certify the subsidiaries’ or suppliers’ satisfaction of certain standards or 
requirements. For example, in the well-known case of the factory fire of Ali 
Enterprises in Pakistan, with 260 killed and 32 injured, the Italian certification 
organisation RINA was involved in the monitoring of, amongst other things, 
the fire safety of the factory. In the case of the collapse of the Rana Plaza 
building in Bangladesh, the German certification organisation TÜV Rheinland 
and the French certification organisation Bureau Veritas (or rather their 
subsidiaries) had issued social audits.1 
Whilst practical and theoretical concerns relating to the quality, in particular, 
of solicited certification paid for by the monitored business have been discussed 
in academic writing — for example in the context of solicited credit rating2 — 
the potential liability of certification organisations towards third parties, and in 
particular victims of malpractice, has received little attention in the past. This 
has changed with the spectacular breast implant scandal involving the French 
company PIP, in the course of which TÜV Rheinland became the target of tort 
law claims of victims. In that case, however, specific issues of EU medical 
devices law were at the centre of the debate. Still, given the steep rise of the 
certification industry in the recent past, and the particular importance of CSR 
certification, the liability of certification organisations deserves broader 
discussion.3 
This article therefore explores potential grounds on which CSR certification 
organisations may incur liability towards third parties, taking into account the 
specific functions that certification has in transnational value chains. 
The article starts with some consideration of the function of certification as a 
form of privatisation of state control, or as a substitute for state control. It then 
presents the potential legal grounds under German and English law for the 
liability of certification bodies towards victims of health and safety problems 
that the certification body should have discovered and reported. English law is 
chosen as representative of the common law world because under the rules of 
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private international law, at least under article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 
864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II)),4 it is 
the law of the country where the damage occurs that applies to the potential 
claims of victims; and those countries where the most spectacular disasters until 
now have occurred were countries whose laws are based on English law, due 
to their colonial history, including Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nigeria. German 
law represents a typical continental legal system, and it offers rich case law 
concerning various types of certification. 
The article discusses in detail different reasons why, and situations in which, 
certification bodies are involved in the governance structure in question. One 
crucial factor to be considered is the extent to which there is public law in the 
background of certification. Therefore, the article first discusses the situation 
where certification is mandated by public law before it moves step by step 
towards the voluntary involvement of certification bodies. After a few words 
on the practically important issue of causation, the article closes with a 
summary of the findings. 
II SAFETY CERTIFICATION AS PRIVATISATION OF A 
PUBLIC TASK OR A GAP-FILLER 
Within a nation state, public security is a classic public task: the ‘state duty to 
protect’ its citizens, as enshrined in national constitutions5 as well as in EU law6 
and in international treaties.7 This encompasses the regulation and control of 
health and safety issues, accompanied by state liability in case control has not 
been carried out with due care. In various fields, however, the control of 
adherence to the safety requirements of certain, inherently high-risk, activities 
or technologies has been privatised and outsourced to private certification 
bodies. These certification bodies remove from the state the burden of 
performing the relevant duties through public authorities.8  
                                                 
4 [2007] OJ L 199/4. 
5 In Germany, that duty is derived from the right of life and physical integrity as enshrined in 
article 2 paragraph 2 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz; GG). See Georg Hermes, Das Grundrecht 
auf Schutz von Leben und Gesundheit (C F Müller, 1987). 
6 For article 2 (right to life) and article 3 (right to the integrity of the person) of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, see Hans D Jarass, Charta der Grundrechte der 
Europäischen Union (C H Beck, 3rd ed, 2016), art 2 para 8 and art 3 para 10. 
7 For the right to life under article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, see, for 
example, European Court of Human Rights, 24 March 2011 — Giuliani and Gaggio v Italy. 
8 See also Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], III ZR 261/54, 30 September 
1957, reported in [1957] Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1927, 1928. 
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In order to guarantee the proper execution of control by private bodies, the state 
usually needs to accredit those bodies on the basis of their capabilities. The 
bodies would need, for example, to demonstrate sufficient expertise, means, 
independence and impartiality. Thus, the ‘state duty to protect’ is replaced by 
the ‘state duty to ensure protection’.9 Still, liability for damage caused by a 
failure to fulfil control duties is an important cornerstone of the safety 
architecture. Consequently, courts have held that, for the assignment of 
liability, it is not relevant whether it is a public or a private entity that carries 
out control tasks; what matters instead are the type and relevance of the duties. 
These duties are defined by law, and they are part of a legal structure that is 
meant to guarantee safety.10 
Following the transnationalisation of production and risks, not only control 
tasks but also the health and safety standards to be met are increasingly being 
privatised. Thus, CSR certification in transnational production chains is usually 
a purely private exercise: In many cases, producers voluntarily join a private 
standardisation system and obtain certification by accredited certifiers; or — in 
a way that is even less formalised — engage a certification body to certify their 
compliance with an agreed bundle of CSR requirements. The issue at stake, 
however, remains the same: the control of adherence to certain health and safety 
requirements in order to ensure public safety or the safety of concerned third 
parties. 
In economic terms, legal liability for insufficient control and for certification 
without the relevant requirements being met, is an important mechanism to 
avoid dysfunctional incentives resulting from the relationship between certifier 
and certified entity. This triggers the question whether, and to what extent, 
private law, and in particular private liability, can function as a substitute for 
state-driven health and safety systems in purely private certification systems. 
This article distinguishes three ideal types of certification situations when 
analysing the potential liability of certification bodies: the mandatory 
certification of mandatory legal requirements; the mandatory certification of 
voluntary (legal or private) requirements; and purely voluntary certification. 
                                                 
9 See also Sebastian Unger, ‘Herstellerbegleitung oder Marktüberwachung? Zur Haftung 
“benannter Stellen” im Medizinproduktrecht’ [2017] Europäische Zeitschrift für 
Wirtschaftsrecht (EuZW) 299, 300–2. 
10 Ibid. 
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III POTENTIAL GROUNDS OF LIABILITY 
The general problem with the liability of certification bodies is that they do not 
stand in a contractual relationship with the potential victim of negligent 
certification such as, for example, the employees in a factory that collapses or 
burns down. Thus, liability can only be found outside the field of contract law 
(in a narrow sense; for a broad understanding see below, III A 2). German law 
and English law appear to differ considerably in their doctrinal approaches to 
third party liability, although this article will show that, while the concepts 
differ, the results may be quite similar. 
A German Law 
1 Tort Law 
The natural starting point for third-party liability is tort law. Here, German law 
avails itself of, besides a number of special statutory torts, two main provisions 
for tortious liability. 
Under § 823 paragraph 1 of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch; 
BGB), a person who, intentionally or negligently, unlawfully injures the life, 
body, health, freedom, property or another right of another person is liable to 
make compensation to the other party for the damage arising from this. This 
paragraph can be loosely compared to the tort of negligence in English law. In 
the case of an omission or of bad performance, liability requires a duty to act in 
favour of the potential victims, which normally results from a risky activity or 
from control over a source of risk. As certification bodies do not themselves 
create risks for workers in or neighbours of production sites, the challenge is to 
derive a duty of care from their function to assess risks and to monitor 
production sites. 
The BGB at § 823 paragraph 2 imposes liability on a person who has breached 
a law that is ‘meant to protect the victim’ (Schutzgesetz), thereby causing harm 
to the victim. In the context of certification, this provision requires a legal 
provision relating to the duties of a certification body, and it is strictly 
dependent on the breach of that legal provision. In other words, once a 
certification body complies with the legal provision, it cannot be liable under § 
823 paragraph 2 BGB. 
A special provision, § 839 BGB, deals with torts committed by civil servants, 
to which we return below. 
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2 Contract with Protective Effect on Third Parties 
Third party liability can also arise out of a contract (in this case between the 
producer and a certification body) with protective effects on third parties (for 
example, the employees). The concept of a ‘contract with protective effect for 
third parties’ was developed by German courts and doctrine in order to cope 
with perceived deficiencies in German tort law.11 Its main field of application 
is liability for pure economic loss (where German tort law is particularly 
restrictive), but it can also apply to physical damage. 
Importantly, and peculiarly, the protective effect does not need to be agreed 
upon by the parties. According to the jurisprudence of the Bundesgerichtshof 
(BGH) [German Federal Court of Justice], it is rather the result of an objective, 
normative, complementary interpretation of the actual agreement in the light of 
the principle of good faith.12 What is decisive are the typical social interests 
stemming from the main contract, its purpose, the legitimate expectations of 
third parties, and principles of equity and usefulness. Thus, the protection of 
third parties may be included in the purpose of a contract even where this is 
clearly not in the interest of one of the parties, namely the party who would be 
liable (in this case the certification organisation), if the will of the party or 
parties is contrary to good faith.13 For that reason, the contract with protective 
effect for third parties is, in substance, closer to tort law than to contract law. 
This is why, in private international law, the potential liability towards third 
parties is considered, in academic writing, to come under international tort 
law.14 
The courts have developed typical cases of contracts that they ascribe a 
protective effect on third parties to. One group is concerned with the liability 
of experts in whose expertise the third party trusts. One leading case turned on 
the liability of an architect who was commissioned to provide an expert opinion 
                                                 
11 On this development in Germany, see Mauro Bussani and Vernon Palmer, ‘The Liability 
Regimes of Europe — Their Facades and Interiors’ in Mauro Bussani and Vernon Palmer (eds), 
Pure Economic Loss in Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 120, 150–1. 
12 See Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], IX ZR 145/11, 14 June 2012, 
reported in [2012] NJW 3165, 3167. 
13 See explicitly Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], X ZR 250/02, 20 April 
2004 reported in [2004] NJW 3035, 3036. See also Peter Gottwald’s commentary in Franz 
Jürgen Säcker et al (eds), Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch (C H Beck, 
7th ed, 2016) vol 2 § 328 BGB paras 168–9. 
14 For details, see Anatol Dutta, ‘Das Statut der Haftung aus Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung für 
Dritte’ [2009] Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 293. See, 
however, OLG Frankfurt [Frankfurt Higher Regional Court], 4 U 269/16, 21 March 2018, 
reported in [2018] Beck-Rechtsprechung (BeckRS) 9098, applying international contract law 
without further explanation. 
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on the condition of a house. The opinion was then presented to potential buyers, 
with the architect’s knowledge. The expert opinion was flawed since the 
architect had never inspected the roof which was defective. The buyer sued the 
architect (because the seller was bankrupt) and won the case in court.15 This 
type of expert liability is also discussed, for example, in relation to rating 
agencies,16 and it has been applied to a classification society that certified the 
classification of a particular vessel.17 
Trust by the third party is, however, not a necessary ingredient of a contract 
with protective effect on third parties. Other court decisions address situations 
where the third party is the ‘real’ beneficiary of the contractual duty, or where 
the third party comes into contact with the contractual duty due to a private or 
work relationship with the other party.18 This latter would be the relevant case 
group for situations in which certification organisations act on behalf of the 
employer or its parent company or the buyer in a supply chain. This is 
particularly true where the contracting party is responsible for the well-being 
of the third party,19 although this is not an indispensable precondition of a 
contract with protective effects on third parties.20 
B English Law 
In English tort law, the liability of certification bodies may stem from the tort 
of negligence. Very generally, liability for negligence arises when one person 
breaches a duty of care owed to another who suffers damage resulting from that 
breach. Under the general rules of the tort of negligence, the crucial question 
would be whether, by entering into a certification contract, the certification 
body assumes a duty of care, for example, for the workers at the factory that it 
certifies. 
                                                 
15 Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], III ZR 50/94, 10 November 1994, 
reported in [1995] NJW 392. 
16 For details, see Halfmeier, above n 2. Until now, the courts have been reluctant to establish 
liability for negligent ratings, pointing at the potentially unlimited and therefore unforeseeable 
number of claimants; see, eg, Landgericht Düsseldorf [Düsseldorf Regional Court], 10 O 
181/15, 17 March 2017, reported in [2017] VuR 383, 384. For convincing counter-arguments, 
see Halfmeier, above n 2. 
17 See Oberlandesgericht Hamburg [Hamburg Higher Regional Court], 6 U 34/90, 14 June 1990, 
reported in [1991] Versicherungsrecht (VersR), 476. 
18 See Gottwald, above n 13, § 328 BGB para 170. 
19 See Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], IVa ZR 20/82, 2 November 1983, 
reported in [1984] NJW 355. 
20 See Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], IX ZR 145/11, 14 June 2012, 
reported in [2012] NJW 3165, 3167. 
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The classic test for this is the three stage test set out in Caparo v Dickman, 
according to which the claimant has to establish that a) the harm was 
foreseeable; b) the relationship between the claimant and the defendant 
was sufficiently proximate; and c) it is fair, just and reasonable that the law 
should impose a duty of a given scope on one party for the benefit of the 
other.21 
An assumption of responsibility is one way to establish the proximity that is 
necessary for liability under the tort of negligence.22 It should, however, be 
noted that the Caparo v Dickman test and the assumption of responsibility tests 
are not different tests but that they are only emanations of the same basic idea, 
namely, that it must be fair and reasonable to impose liability on the 
defendant.23 
The voluntary assumption of a duty of care is not alien to English tort law.24 
Authors have described the assumption of responsibility as a gap-filler between 
tortious and contractual liability,25 showing its relation with the German 
doctrine of contracts with protective effect on third parties. It is just that English 
law chose tort law as the relevant category for this type of responsibility. 
Assumption of responsibility covers situations where third parties rely on 
expert opinions, as first established in the landmark case of Hedley Byrne v 
Heller.26 Crucially, English courts regard assumed responsibility as a 
responsibility that has been voluntarily accepted by the expert in question.27 As 
in the case of the German law on contracts with protective effect on third 
parties, however, ‘voluntary’ does not necessarily mean that the parties actually 
wish the one party to be liable for damage caused to third parties. Case law 
suggests that it is rather an objective test.28 For example in Chandler v Cape 
Lady Justice Arden, while applying the concept of assumption of responsibility, 
                                                 
21 [1990] UKHL 2. 
22 See, eg, Bishara v Sheffield Teaching Hospitals [2007] EWCA, Civ 353 [11]. 
23 See, eg, Lungowe and others v Vedanta Resources Plc and Konkola Copper Mines Plc [2017] 
EWCA Civ 1528 [81]. 
24 Stathis Banakas, ‘Voluntary Assumption of Tort Liability in English Law: A Paradox?’ [2009] 
(4) InDret 1; Andrew Robertson and Julia Wang, ‘The Assumption of Responsibility’ in Kit 
Barker, Ross Grantham and Warren Swain (eds), The Law of Misstatements: 50 Years on from 
Hedley Byrne v Heller (Hart Publishing, 2015) 49. 
25 See Martin Petrin, ‘Assumption of Responsibility in Corporate Groups: Chandler v Cape plc’ 
(2013) 76 Modern Law Review 603, 614 with fn 74. 
26 [1964] AC 465. 
27 See Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1994] 3 All ER 506, 528–9. 
28 See Williams and another v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd and Mistlin [1997] 1 BCLC 131 
(Lord Steyn). 
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concluded that ‘this case demonstrates that in appropriate circumstances the law 
may impose on a parent company responsibility for the health and safety of its 
subsidiary’s employees’.29 This position has, however, been disputed in 
academic writing.30 
Moreover, English courts have applied the doctrine of assumption of 
responsibility to physical harm caused to third parties. According to the 
traditional formula, a sufficient relationship of proximity will exist when 
someone possessed of a special skill undertakes to apply that skill for the 
assistance of another person who relies upon such skill and there is a direct and 
substantial reliance by the plaintiff on the defendant’s skill.31 In Phelps v 
Hillingdon London Borough Council, the House of Lords held that a person 
exercising a particular skill or profession might owe a duty of care in its 
performance to those who might foreseeably be injured if due care and skill 
were not exercised.32 
The courts have applied the concept of assumption of responsibility in many 
ways, for which they have sometimes been criticised in academic writing.33 As 
Lord Bingham emphasised in Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays 
Bank plc,34 much depends on ‘the detailed circumstances of the particular case 
and the particular relationship between the parties in the context of their legal 
and factual situation as a whole’. Whether there has been an assumption of 
responsibility is a mixed question of fact and law but the importance of the 
detailed circumstances means that the findings of the tribunal of fact as to those 
circumstances are likely to be of considerable significance.35 
IV LIABILITY OF CERTIFICATION BODIES 
In this section, we apply the potential grounds of liability as briefly set out 
above to the various situations in which certification takes place. We start with 
situations in which safety certification is mandated by law. We then turn to a 
situation where certification is voluntary but constitutes a precondition for state 
benefits. Moving on to the private sphere, we consider the situation where 
certification takes place in the framework of a private scheme with or without 
                                                 
29 Chandler v Cape plc [2012] EWCA Civ 525 [80] (emphasis added). 
30 For an account, see Robertson and Wang, above n 24. 
31 See Capital & Counties PLC v Hampshire County Council [1997] QB 1004 [1034]. 
32 Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council [2000] 4 All ER 504. 
33 On which see Petrin, above n 25, 611–8. 
34 [2007] AC 181. 
35 See Lejonvarn v Burgess [2017] EWCA Civ 254 [69]. 
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the involvement of representatives of the interests of potential victims, such as 
NGOs or trade unions that are active in setting CSR standards. The final 
situation that we consider is the entirely voluntary use of third party 
certification within a company’s health and safety management system. 
A Legally Required Certification 
1 The National Context  
a) German Road Traffic Safety Certification  Safety certification 
as a public law task has existed for a long time. One of the most prominent 
activities of private organisations — such as the various TÜVs but nowadays 
also competitors such as DEKRA (the Deutscher Kraftfahrzeug-
Überwachungs-Verein or German Motor Vehicle Inspection Association) — is 
the regular bi-annual control of the safety of cars, under § 29 of the German 
Road Vehicle Registration Regulation (Straßenverkehrszulassungsordnung, 
StVZO). The private organisations that perform the controls are entrusted with 
this task by state authorities. The experts carrying out the controls must have a 
specific education that is regulated by law, and they must be accredited.36 In 
the past, not all safety controls met the relevant standards, and there have been 
cases in which, for example, the inadequate safety of cars that had just been 
checked led to accidents. 
In German jurisprudence, the question concerning liability was answered as 
follows. Without any doubt, the purpose of § 29 StVZO is to keep unsafe cars 
away from public roads.37 Thus, the experts who perform the controls owe a 
duty of care to the victims of unsafe cars that should have been removed from 
public roads. 
More controversial was the issue of whether liability lies with the certifier or 
with the state. In the German legal system, article 34 GG and § 839 of the Civil 
Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB) deal with state liability. Under article 
34 GG, if any person, in the exercise of a public office entrusted to him, violates 
his official duty to a third party, liability shall rest principally with the state or 
public body that employs him. The reason is that the victim should be able to 
                                                 
36 See the Gesetz über amtlich anerkannte Sachverständige und amtlich anerkannte Prüfer für 
den Kraftfahrzeugverkehr [Act on officially recognised experts and officially recognised 
inspectors for road traffic] (KfSachvG) of 22 December 1971, Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBl) 1971 
I, 2086. 
37 See Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], III ZR 178/53, 11 July 1955, 
reported in [1955] NJW 1316. 
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claim damages from a solvent defendant.38 Thus, if the certification 
organisation exercises a public office and thereby causes damage accidentally, 
it is not the certification organisation but the state — in this case the relevant 
Land — that is liable.39 
Indeed, the civil courts have treated the activities under § 21 StVZG as the 
exercise of a public office. In the leading judgment of November 1967, the 
Federal Supreme Court (BGH) emphasised that it did not matter that the TÜV 
was a private entity. What matters instead is the type and the relevance of the 
duties of the TÜV experts. These are defined by law, and they are part of a legal 
structure that is meant to guarantee the safety of road traffic, thus to perform a 
public duty.40 Although the private organisations, such as the various TÜVs, or 
DEKRA, or their experts, could not themselves issue binding decisions relating 
to the admission of cars to public traffic, their report is the relevant basis for the 
decision of the competent authority. The BGH also decided that the fact that 
the TÜV experts are neither commissioned nor paid by the state41 but by the car 
owner was irrelevant, since, after all, the car owner had to pay for a service that 
was organised by the state in the interest of the car owner.42 
b) English Aircraft Certification Certification as a public law 
requirement has been dealt with in the case of Perrett v Collins,43 dealing with 
an aircraft crash. 
The flying of aircraft in the United Kingdom is regulated by the Civil Aviation 
Act 1982 (CAA 1982). Section 60 authorises the Crown by Order in Council to 
give effect to the obligations of the United Kingdom under the Chicago 
                                                 
38 See Landgericht Berlin [Berlin Regional Court], 53 S 229/66, 28 April 1967, reported in [1967] 
NJW 1663, 1664. 
39 For similar questions relating to vessel classification, see Vibe Ulfbeck and Anders Møllmann, 
‘Public Function Liability of Classification Societies’ in Rott, above n 3 (forthcoming). 
40 See Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], VII ZR 34/65, 30 November 1967, 
reported in [1968] NJW 443. See also Landgericht Berlin [Berlin Regional Court], 53 S 229/66, 
28 April 1967, reported in [1967] NJW 1663. 
41 Unlike an expert in construction analysis in an earlier state liability case (see 
Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], III ZR 48/62, 27 May 1963, reported in 
[1963] NJW 1821), and a doctor who was commissioned by the competent Land to examine 
harm caused by war injuries (see Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], III ZR 
194/59, 19 December 1960, reported in [1961] NJW 969). 
42 See Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], VII ZR 34/65, 30 November 1967, 
reported in [1968] NJW 443. 
43 [1998] EWCA Civ 884. 
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Convention44 and to regulate air navigation. The Civil Aviation Authority is the 
statutory regulator of air transport in the United Kingdom. Section 3 of the 1982 
Act lays down the functions of the Authority which include  
such functions as are for the time being conferred on it by or under Air 
Navigation Orders with respect to the registration of aircraft, the safety of air 
navigation and aircraft (including airworthiness), the control of air traffic, the 
certification of operators of aircraft ...  
The relevant Air Navigation Order for the purposes of this case was the Air 
Navigation Order 1989. Under article 7(1) of the Order there is a requirement 
that an aircraft should not fly unless a valid Certificate of Airworthiness is in 
force in relation to the aircraft. Article 8(1) of the Order provides that the 
Authority shall issue a certificate of airworthiness if it is satisfied that the 
aircraft is fit for flying having regard to the design, construction, workmanship 
and materials of the aircraft which it considers necessary for the airworthiness 
of the aircraft. 
Under article 110 CAA 1982, the Civil Aviation Authority may approve a 
person as qualified to furnish reports to it and may accept such reports. In 
Perrett v Collins,45 it was a safety inspector who negligently issued the 
certificate despite the fact that the aircraft was unsafe. The Court of Appeal 
found that inspector liable because of his function within a system of controls 
that is meant to protect the passengers and the public from crashes of unsafe 
aircraft. 
Interestingly, and in line with German case law, the court distinguished this 
from situations where only economic interests are harmed and saw these as 
outside the scope of protection of the CAA 1982.46 
A difference from the German legal system lies in the possibility in the UK of 
suing the person immediately in charge of the safety relevant duty, which is not 
possible under German state liability law.47 Under the English system of the 
CAA 1982, the person in charge will, however, be indemnified by the 
regulatory authority, the Civil Aviation Authority. 
                                                 
44 Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed 7 December 1944 (entered into force 4 
April 1947) <https://www.icao.int/publications/pages/doc7300.aspx>. 
45 [1998] EWCA Civ 884. 
46 See also Philcox v Civil Aviation Authority (Unreported, Court of Appeal, Civil Division, 
Staughton LJ, Millett LJ and Ward LJ, 25 May 1995).  
47 See also Ulfbeck and Møllmann, above n 39. 
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2 The European Context — EU Product Safety Law 
The European context is somewhat special, as here we face a two-fold question. 
First, does EU law itself impose, or does it rather require Member States to 
impose, liability on certification bodies that breach their duties? Alternatively, 
do Member States impose liability autonomously? 
Safety certification is also an essential component of EU product safety law,48 
and the role and liability of certification organisations in EU product safety law 
have received wide attention in the context of the PIP breast implant scandal. 
The system can be briefly illustrated with the example of EU medical devices 
law. 
Medical devices come under a self-certification system, first established by 
Directive 93/42/EEC concerning medical devices.49 It was replaced in 2017 by 
the Medical Devices Regulation (EU) 2017/745.50 This system requires the 
producer who puts a medical device into circulation to certify that the device 
complies with the required safety standards. The EU legislator has, however, 
recognised that some medical devices pose a higher risk to patients than others. 
For example, whilst the risk associated with a hypodermic needle appears to be 
low, the same does not apply to artificial hips or breast implants. Therefore, 
medical products are classified into different categories. In the case of high risk 
products, which include breast implants,51 the producer is allowed to affix the 
CE (Conformité Européenne) mark that indicates conformity with the relevant 
safety standards, only if the product design has been certified by a ‘notified 
body’. Notified bodies are certification bodies that have been notified by 
Member States to the European Commission, thus the notion ‘notified bodies’. 
Notified bodies need to satisfy a number of requirements set out in Annex XI 
to the abovementioned Directive 93/42/EEC, relating to: the independence 
from the manufacturer of the notified body and its personnel; its professional 
integrity and financial independence; the fact that it has sufficient resources and 
facilities to carry out its tasks; the relevant qualifications of personnel; the 
                                                 
48 See, eg, Harm Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance. Product Standards in the 
regulation of Integrating Markets (Hart Publishing, 2005). 
49 Council Directive 93/42/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning Medical Devices [1993] OJ L 169/1. 
50 Regulation (EU) 2017/745 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2017 on 
Medical Devices, amending Directive 2001/83/EC, Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 and 
Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 and repealing Council Directives 90/385/EEC and 93/42/EEC 
[2017] OJ L 117/1. 
51 See Commission Directive 2003/12/EC of 3 February 2003 on the reclassification of breast 
implants in the framework of Directive 93/42/EEC concerning medical devices [2003] OJ L 
28/43. 
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impartiality of the organisation and, finally, its protection by professional 
indemnity insurance. In formal terms, notified bodies need to be designated by 
the competent authority of their home state or by another body that has been 
entrusted with the task of providing accreditation services. It is the special 
expertise of that notified body that adds the necessary safety to the process. 
Duties of the notified body relate to the pre-marketing stage and to post-
marketing monitoring. At the pre-marketing stage, the notified body must, on 
application of the producer, audit the quality management system of the 
producer. This system must guarantee that the products conform to the 
provisions of the Directive which apply to them at every stage of manufacture, 
from design to final inspection. The notified body must also examine the 
manufacturer’s dossier relating to the product design in order to ensure its 
conformity with the requirements of the Directive.52 
At the post-marketing stage, the Directive imposes surveillance duties on the 
notified body. According to section 5.1 of Annex II, the aim of surveillance is 
to ensure that the manufacturer duly fulfils the obligations imposed by the 
approved quality management system. To that end, the notified body must 
periodically carry out appropriate inspections and assessments to make sure that 
the manufacturer applies the approved quality management system, and must 
supply the manufacturer with an assessment report (section 5.3 of Annex II). In 
addition, the notified body may pay unannounced visits to the manufacturer. At 
the time of such visits, the notified body may, where necessary, carry out or ask 
for tests to be carried out in order to check that the quality management system 
is working properly (section 5.4 of Annex II).  
In the PIP case, the French producer Poly Implant Prothèse (PIP) had produced 
cheap and defective breast implants that were used on about 300 000 women 
worldwide. When the scandal was revealed by the French authorities, PIP filed 
for bankruptcy, and the attention of the victims turned to TÜV Rheinland which 
had certified the product design (correctly) but which had also been responsible, 
as a notified body, for monitoring on-going compliance with the product 
design. Victims of the PIP scandal allege that the fraudulent behaviour of PIP 
had been possible only because TÜV Rheinland had always announced its 
inspection visits eleven days in advance, with the result that PIP had been able, 
for the duration of the inspection, to change the manufacturing process back to 
the certified system. Moreover, victims claimed that TÜV Rheinland should 
have checked the books which would have revealed that the amount of medical 
silicone purchased by no means corresponded with the number of breast 
                                                 
52 See, in particular, Annex II Sec 3.3 and 4.3 of Council Directive 93/42/EEC of 14 June 1993 
concerning Medical Devices [1993] OJ L 169/1. 
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implants produced. TÜV Rheinland defended itself by arguing that section 5.4 
of Annex II did not require notified bodies to pay unannounced visits in the 
absence of any cause for mistrust, and that no such cause had been 
recognisable.53 
Leaving aside the controversial question of whether or not TÜV Rheinland had 
actually breached its duties under the Medical Devices Directive, a question 
that required clarification from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) arose in the 
case of Elisabeth Schmitt.54 The case was a referral from the German BGH,55 
and was ultimately decided by the BGH in the negative56 but is still pending in 
French courts.57 The relevant question for this article is whether or not TÜV 
Rheinland would be liable to the victims if it did breach its duties (of care). 
                                                 
53 For detailed discussion, see Peter Rott and Carola Glinski, ‘Die Haftung der 
Zertifizierungsstelle im Produktsicherheitsrecht’ [2015] (1) Zeitschrift für Europäisches 
Privatrecht(ZEuP) 192; Barend van Leeuwen, ‘PIP Breast Implants, the EU’s New Approach 
for Goods and Market Surveillance by Notified Bodies’ (2014) 5 European Journal of Risk 
Regulation 338; Jan De Bruyne and Cedric Vanleenhove, ‘Liability in the Medical Sector: The 
‘Breast-Taking’ Consequences of the Poly Implant Prothèse Case’ (2016) 24 European Review 
of Private Law 823. 
54 Elisabeth Schmitt v TÜV Rheinland LGA Products GmbH (C-219/15) [2017] ECJ, 128; on 
which see Peter Rott, ‘Pflichten und Haftung der “benannten Stelle” bei Hochrisiko-
Medizinprodukten’ [2017] NJW 1146; Gert Brüggemeier, ‘Fehlerhafte Brustimplantate und die 
Haftung der Zertifizierungsinstitute — Das EuGH-Urteil in der Rechtssache Schmitt v TÜV 
Rheinland’ [2017] Medizinrecht (MedR) 527; Unger, above n 9; Jörg Heynemann, ‘Haftung 
der Benannten Stelle für die fehlerhafte “Überwachung” mangelhafter Medizinprodukte oder 
allgemeines Lebensrisiko?’, (2017) Gesundheit und Pflege (GuP) 98; Marc Oeben, 
‘Drittschutzwirkung der Konformitätsbewertung und Pflichtenkorsett der Benannten Stelle’ 
[2017] Medizinprodukterecht (MPR) 42; Julia Kathrin Degen, ‘Die Haftung der “Benannten 
Stelle” iSv § 3 Nr 20 MPG’ [2017] VersR 462; Gerhard Wagner, ‘Marktaufsichtshaftung 
produktsicherheitsrechtlicher Zertifizierungsstellen’ [2018] Juristenzeitung (JZ) 130. 
55 Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], VII ZR 36/14, 9 April 2015, reported 
in [2015] VuR 271 with case note by Peter Rott. 
56 Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], VII ZR 36/14, 22 June 2017, [2017] 
VuR 392, with case note by Peter Rott. That, however, may not have been the final word yet as 
the claimant has raised a number of potential (new) reasons why TÜV Rheinland should have 
mistrusted PIP and its products, reasons that the BGH could not, for reasons of civil procedural 
law, consider in its decision on the case of Ms Schmitt. In contrast, these reasons will have to 
be considered in other cases that are still pending in the instance courts. See also Heynemann, 
above n 54, 100; Markus Finn, ‘Keine Haftung mangels nachgewiesener Hinweise auf 
minderwertige Brustimplantate’ [2017] NJW 2590, 2592. For critique, see also Gert 
Brüggemeier, ‘Luxemburg locuta, causa finita? — Eine Nachbetrachtung der juristischen 
Behandlung der sogenannten PIP-Affäre in Deutschland’ [2018] JZ 191. 
57 The Tribunal de commerce de Toulon [Toulon Commercial Court], 2011F00517, 14 November 
2013 (Société GF Electromedics & société EMI importacao e Distribucao Ltda & société J & 
D Medicals et autres intervenants volontaires), found TÜV Rheinland liable; on which see 
Véronique Fröding, ‘Industriesilikon in Brustimplantaten — Urteil des Handelsgerichtes 
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a) EU Law The Medical Devices Directive had established a public law 
control system involving producers and notified bodies but was silent on civil 
law remedies. Since the ECJ had nevertheless found individual remedies in EU 
law in the past,58 academics anticipated that it would come to the same result if 
it found that the Medical Devices Directive, and the role of notified bodies 
therein, was to protect patients. 
To determine whether they were right about this an analysis of the function of 
the notified bodies within the system of medical devices safety law is required. 
This function has been subject to controversy, in particular in the German courts 
dealing with the PIP scandal. The debate has been triggered by the 
abovementioned requirement of § 823 paragraph 2 BGB that the law that was 
breached (Schutzgesetz) must be meant to protect the victim. 
The notified body is involved in the certification of a particular medical device 
by virtue of a contract with the producer.59 On this basis some German courts 
had concluded that the role that medical devices law ascribes to notified bodies 
is merely to help the producer to achieve the level of safety that is required to 
put its products on the market. Consequently, they argued that it was not for the 
notified body but only for the producer to protect the victims from unsafe 
products.60 They found support for their view in the fact that public authorities 
are also involved in the safety of medical devices as the control of products that 
have been put into circulation lies in their hands; from which they concluded 
                                                 
(Tribunal de Commerce) Toulon vom 14 November 2013’ [2014] MPR 1. On appeal, the Cour 
d’appel d’Aix-en-Provence [Aix-en-Provence Court of Appeal], No 2015/21, 22 January 2015, 
found no breach; on which see Véronique Fröding, ‘PIP Brustimplantate: Warum das 
Berufungsgericht Aix-en-Provence die Haftung des TÜV abgelehnt hat’ (2015) MPR 162. The 
Cour de cassation has repealed that decision and ordered a new trial before the Cour d’appel de 
Paris [Paris Court of Appeal], Arrêt n° 610, 10 October 2018 (15-26.093); Arrêt n° 615, 10 
October 2018 (16-19.430).and Arrêt n° 616, 10 October 2018 (17-14.401), all available at 
<https://www.courdecassation.fr>. 
58 See, eg, the cartel law case of Courage Ltd v Bernhard Crehan (C-453/99) [2001] ECJ 465, 
para 27. 
59 See, eg, Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], III ZR 339/09, 31 March 2011, 
reported in [2011] Monatsschrift des deutschen Rechts (MDR) 658.  
60 See especially Oberlandesgericht Zweibrücken [Zweibrücken Higher Regional Court], 4 U 
66/13, 30 January 2014, reported in [2014] MPR 62, 65 with case note by Boris Handorn: 
‘Industriesilikon in Brustimplantaten — OLG Zweibrücken bestätigt fehlende Haftung der 
Benannten Stelle’, [2014] MPR, 84. See also Andreas Spickhoff, in: Andreas Spickhoff (ed), 
Medizinrecht (C H Beck, 2nd ed, 2014) § 15a MPG para 3; Hannes Beyerbach, ‘Haftung der 
Benannten Stelle für Mängel in der Medizinprodukteherstellung?’ [2015] Gesundheitsrecht 
(GesR) 522, 525. 
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that there should be no duplication of responsibilities in the post-marketing 
control of medical devices.61 
In contrast, some academic authors argued that the role of notified bodies in the 
law on high-risk medical devices was precisely to protect patients.62 They found 
support in the recitals of the Directive as well as in a statement by the 
Commission, according to which ‘[c]onformity assessment is a key to trust and 
confidence in the regulatory system’s capacity to protect patients and 
citizens’.63 Advocate General Sharpston shared the view 
that it is the purpose and intention of Directive 93/42 that, in the case of Class 
III medical devices, the notified body responsible for auditing the quality 
system, examining the design of the product and surveillance acts in order to 
protect all potential patients and may therefore, in the event of a culpable 
infringement of an obligation under that directive, be liable to the patients 
and users concerned.64 
The Court confirmed that the Directive serves, amongst other things, the health 
and safety of patients. 
Nevertheless, the ECJ held that the Directive did not require Member States to 
impose civil liability on notified bodies who breach their duties under the 
Directive, while at the same time not excluding the possibility of national law 
imposing such liability.65 The judgment was criticised in academic writing for 
two reasons. Brüggemeier compares the safety system of medical devices law 
with the German national safety systems and concludes that, functionally, the 
certification bodies fulfil a public task and, therefore, their failure should trigger 
state liability.66 Other authors point out that the need for the Medical Devices 
                                                 
61 See expressly Oberlandesgericht Zweibrücken [Zweibrücken Higher Regional Court], 4 U 
66/13, 30 January 2014, reported in [2014] MPR 62, 65. 
62 For detailed analysis, see Rott and Glinski, above n 53, 204. See also Gerald Spindler, in Beate 
Gsell et al (eds), Beck-online Großkommentar (C H Beck, 2017) § 823 Schadensersatzpflicht, 
para 304; Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt [Frankfurt Higher Regional Court], 8 U 168/13, 13 
January 2015, [2015] BeckRS 09145. 
63 European Commission Communication on medical devices, COM (2003) 386 final, 6.1. 
64 Elisabeth Schmitt v TÜV Rheinland LGA Products GmbH (C-219/15) [2016] ECJ 694, para 40 
(AG Sharpston). 
65 Elisabeth Schmitt v TÜV Rheinland LGA Products GmbH (C-219/15) [2016] ECJ, paras 55–
60. 
66 See Brüggemeier, above n 54, 528. 
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Directive to be effective would seem to make a liability regime indispensable. 
The PIP scandal was seen to provide ample evidence of this.67 
b) German Law — Breach of a Statutory Duty As mentioned above, 
the BGH had raised the question of the protective aim of the notified bodies’ 
role and function because of the specific tort law provision of § 823 paragraph 
2 BGB, which imposes liability for the breach of a statutory duty only if that 
duty is to protect the victim. That question was answered by the ECJ in the 
affirmative so that, under German tort law, the potential liability of notified 
bodies for damage to third parties is confirmed.68 
The certification body and the producer would then be jointly and severally 
liable (§ 830 paragraph 1 BGB). Unless the producer is bankrupt, the 
certification body could then claim redress from the producer who has the 
primary responsibility for the defective products (§ 840 BGB). 
Other potential grounds of liability have been left open or have not been 
discussed at all by the courts, whereas they have been raised in academic 
writing. 
c) German Law — General Tort Law  Liability could also stem 
from the general tort law provision of § 823 paragraph 1 BGB. In particular, 
Brüggemeier has convincingly argued that, through its very function in the 
safety control system of medical devices law, the notified body owes a duty of 
care to the recipients of breast implants not to harm them through negligent 
monitoring of the producer.69 In that sense, the duty of care corresponds with 
the protective purpose of the law, the breach of which triggers liability under 
§ 823 paragraph 2 BGB.70 In fact, § 823 paragraph 1 BGB is the more 
appropriate route, as § 823 paragraph 2 is meant to apply where 
§ 823 paragraph 1 is inapplicable because none of the interests that are 
protected by § 823 paragraph 1 (life, health and so on) is concerned, thus mainly 
in cases of pure economic loss. 
As opposed to liability under § 823 paragraph 2 BGB, liability under § 823 
paragraph 1 BGB is not delimited to the breach of the public law duties laid 
                                                 
67 See Rott, above n 54, 1147; Wagner, above n 54, 136. See also Maria Mesch, ‘BGH: Haftung 
der benannten Stelle bei fehlerhaften Medizinprodukten’ [2017] Kommentierte BGH-
Rechtsprechung Lindenmeier-Möhring (LMK) 395640. 
68 See Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], VII ZR 36/14, 22 June 2017, [2017] 
VuR 392. 
69 See Brüggemeier, above n 54, 529. See also Wagner, above n 54, 136. 
70 Wagner, above n 54, 136.  
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down in the protective law but depends on the general tort law criteria of 
foreseeability and avoidability of damage. Public law rules only provide for 
minimum requirements on what needs to be done to prevent damage. The same 
applies to other types of public or private standards or to ‘best practices’ which 
provide mere indicators on what may be sufficient under normal 
circumstances.71 Thus, the notified body would not be protected by the standard 
of care of the public law regime of the Medical Devices Directive if it was 
foreseeable that this was insufficient to prevent harm to victims.72 In particular, 
the regime of § 823 paragraph 1 BGB could overcome the lack of an explicit 
duty to pay unannounced visits to the producer’s factory, as unsolicited visits 
can be regarded as a common standard in the certification business.73 In its 
decision on the PIP case, the BGH has not even mentioned this possible route. 
d) German Law — Contract with Protective Effect on Third Parties        
Finally, liability could arise out of a contract between the producer and the 
notified body, with protective effects on the recipients of the breast implants.  
In the PIP case, the German OLG [Oberlandesgericht, Higher Regional Court] 
Zweibrücken had explicitly rejected the idea of the contract between PIP and 
TÜV Rheinland having protective effect for the recipients of breast implants. 
This conclusion was, however, based on the above-mentioned misapprehension 
that the involvement of the notified body was merely meant to help the 
producer. The BGH has not provided further clarification because it did not see 
a breach of duty in the first place. 
Given the ‘real purpose’ of the notified body to protect patients, as confirmed 
by the ECJ, the contract between PIP and TÜV Rheinland could be classified 
as a contract with protective effects on the recipients of breast implants.74 
                                                 
71 See generally Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], VI ZR 11/52, 3 December 
1952, reported in [1953] VersR 82 (forest fire); Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of 
Justice], VI ZR 223/82, 18 September 1984, reported in [1985] NJW 47 (industry emissions); 
Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], VI ZR 183/97, 26 May 1998, reported 
in [1998] NJW 2436 (fireworks). For detailed analysis, see Carola Glinski, Die rechtliche 
Bedeutung der privaten Regulierung globaler Produktionsstandards (Nomos, 2010) 263–79, 
with further references. 
72 See Rott and Glinski, above n 53, 207; Brüggemeier, above n 54, 530. 
73 For references, see Rott and Glinski, above n 53, 206. 
74 See also Brüggemeier, above n 56, 195; cf Wagner, above n 54, 137, who points at the fact 
that the duties of the notified body are not defined in the contract but by law. Still, the notified 
body only became involved because of a contract with the producer, whereas the producer could 
have just as well chosen another notified body. 
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e) Liability under English Tort Law Lawsuits against TÜV Rheinland 
have not been brought in the UK. Victims from the UK have joined collective 
actions in France, or claimants have resorted to suing the traders that have 
supplied breast implants, or their insurers,75 or their clinics or surgeons, or 
credit card companies under s75 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 which gives 
a ‘like claim’ against finance providers where claimants purchased their 
operations using their credit cards.76 
The PIP situation seems to be comparable to the above-mentioned case of 
Perrett v Collins,77 where the Court of Appeal based the safety officer’s duty 
of care on his function within a system of controls that is meant to protect the 
passengers and the public from crashes of unsafe aircraft. Likewise, notified 
bodies are under statutory obligations to monitor producers of medical devices, 
and likewise, this is a function that, according to the ECJ in Elisabeth Schmitt, 
notified bodies exercise in an equivalent way in the area of medical devices.78 
B Voluntary Systems with Mandatory Certification 
Beyond the establishment of mandatory CSR certification schemes, there have 
been calls for a long time to make compliance, with human rights norms in 
particular, but also with social and environmental protection, attractive for 
transnational corporations. In various ways, systems have been set up which 
producers or traders can voluntarily join, but which, if joined, require 
mandatory certification of compliance with certain rules. In the following, we 
briefly consider two types of such systems. 
1 Public Law-Induced Voluntary Systems with Mandatory 
Certification 
Public law-induced certification systems already exist in the transnational 
sphere in the area of biofuels.79 The promotion of biofuels is part of the effort 
of EU law, under Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy 
                                                 
75 Most claims have been settled in the meantime. For an account of the complicated litigation, 
see Travelers Insurance Company Ltd v XYZ [2018] EWCA Civ 1099. 
76 See also Barend van Leeuwen, European Standardisation of Services and its Impact on Private 
Law (Hart Publishing, 2017) 150. 
77 [1998] EWCA Civ 884. 
78 See above, IV A 2 a. 
79 For detailed analysis, see Carola Glinski, ‘Certification of the Sustainability of Biofuels’ in 
Rott, above n 3 (forthcoming). 
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from renewable sources,80 to achieve renewable energy promotion goals. Thus, 
under article 3(4) of Directive 2009/28/EC, each Member State shall ensure that 
the share of energy from renewable sources in all forms of transport in 2020 is 
at least 10 per cent of the final energy consumption in transport in that Member 
State. In relation to energy from biofuels and bioliquids, article 17 of the 
Directive lays down sustainability criteria that need to be met irrespective of 
whether the raw materials were cultivated inside or outside the territory of the 
EU. Amongst other things, the greenhouse gas emission saving from the use of 
biofuels must reach certain thresholds, and biofuels shall not be made from raw 
material obtained from land with high biodiversity value or from land with high 
carbon stock. 
As direct public law control of compliance with these requirements in many 
biofuels producing countries outside the EU is difficult, the EU and the Member 
States have recognised private certification schemes. The schemes have to meet 
the minimum standards of EU law, though they can add further substantive 
standards, and the schemes (as well as the certification bodies in some Member 
States) need the approval of the European Commission or, in the case of 
national schemes, of the competent authorities of the Member States. 
Leaving aside the controversy about the success of the system,81 it should be 
clear that such a system is, in principle, similar in its design to the medical 
devices safety system of EU law, although its purpose is of course limited to 
climate protection. Nevertheless, if such a system were designed, for example, 
to protect workers in supply chains, the logic of the PIP case could be 
transferred to the liability of the certification organisations involved. 
As far as the liability of certification bodies is concerned, the difference from 
the situations discussed previously is that the meeting of certain requirements 
by the parent company or buyer in a supply chain, including the involvement 
of a certification body, is entirely voluntary. Thus, the breach of the duties 
under such schemes cannot be seen as the breach of a statutory duty, whereas 
it may well be the breach of a duty of care that is derived from the participation 
in the scheme, or as the breach of a contract with protective effects on third 
parties. 
                                                 
80 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the 
Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources and Amending and Subsequently 
Repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC [2009] OJ L 140/16. 
81 For a critical analysis of the voluntary schemes at EU level, see the European Court of Auditors, 
Special Report No18/2016: The EU system for the Certification of Sustainable Biofuels 
(Publications Office of the European Union, 2016) 27. 
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a) German Law — Contract with Protective Effects on Third Parties         
In the abovementioned scenario, the certification body is involved through a 
contract with the producer or service provider who seeks to reap the benefits of 
socially responsible behaviour and therefore needs to meet specified CSR 
requirements. 
What is crucial for a protective effect on third parties (the workers) is that, in 
an objective interpretation of the contract, the ‘real beneficiaries’ of the contract 
must be the employees of subsidiaries or suppliers. The fact that the ‘real 
beneficiaries’ are the employees of subsidiaries or suppliers can be derived 
from the purpose of the certification exercise. If certification of the safety of 
those employees is a precondition for tax advantages or subsidies, the purpose 
of protecting the employees is apparent, as the state thereby intends to live up, 
for example, to its own protective duties stemming from international law 
instruments,82 or simply to self-defined protective aims. 
In this regard, the situation — a contractual agreement with protective effects 
on third parties — does not differ from the situation under a mandatory 
certification scheme. 
b) German Law — Tort Law  Under § 823 paragraph 1 BGB, the 
question is whether the certification organisation has the duty (Verkehrspflicht) 
to contribute to the prevention of damage by exercising skill and care in 
detecting safety problems and notifying its contracting partner — the parent 
company or the buyer in a supply chain — of them. Clearly, there is no legal 
obligation to do so in the absence of a legal regime that requires certification, 
and the certification organisation would not have an original duty of care either, 
as it has neither created the risk nor is it originally responsible for the safety of 
the factory. However, its duty to prevent damage can be derived from the duty 
of care on the part of its contracting partner. 
                                                 
82 Such as the so-called Ruggie Framework. See John Ruggie, Special Representative, Protect, 
Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, UN doc A/HRC/8/5 (7 
April 2008) <http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf>; John 
Ruggie, Special Representative, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, UN doc 
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17.31.pdf>. On the state responsibility to promote human rights extraterritorially, see Markus 
Krajewski, ‘Regulierung transnationaler Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zum Schutz der 
Menschenrechte: Staatliche Schutzpflichten jenseits der Grenze?’ in Markus Krajewski (ed), 
Staatliche Schutzpflichten und unternehmerische Verantwortung für Menschenrechte in 
globalen Lieferketten (FAU University Press, 2018) 103. 
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Obviously, a person can take over duties from another person (or company) and 
thereby assume the duty of care. For example, if an independent contractor or 
a tenant undertakes, by way of contract, to sweep snow for a house owner, he 
will be liable if, due to his negligence, someone slips and suffers damage.83 
The concept requires two elements, however: an existing duty of care84 on the 
part of the parent company or the buyer in a supply chain, and the taking over 
of that duty of care by the certification organisation. 
The first requirement is easily satisfied where it is the producer and employer 
who commissions a certification body to monitor certain aspects of health and 
safety or of environmental protection. Usually, however, it will be the parent 
company or the buyer in a supply chain who does so. The parent company, or 
the buyer, in a supply chain, are however not under a legal duty to participate 
in a scheme but may only do so because the scheme offers them advantages, 
such as tax reduction. 
They may, however, be under a legal duty for other reasons, in particular 
because they are in control of the production site. This situation is, however, 
unrelated to state benefits and will be discussed later. 
c) English Law Under the general rules of the tort of negligence, the 
crucial question would be whether, by entering into a certification contract, the 
certification organisation assumes a duty of care for the workers. The answer 
to this must be found in an application of the three step test of Caparo v 
Dickman, with special consideration of the case law relating to the assumption 
of responsibility. Foreseeability is not at issue as it is perfectly foreseeable that 
negligent certification will lead to inactivity on the part of the parent company 
or buyer in a supply chain, whereas the parent company or buyer could 
otherwise take action to make the immediate producer remedy the problem. 
Thus, we focus on proximity and on whether it is fair, just and reasonable to 
impose liability on the certification body. 
Most notably, in Chandler v Cape, the concept of assumption of responsibility 
was extended by the Court of Appeal to cover a situation where a parent 
company had ‘relevant’ (not total) control over its subsidiary; the parent had, 
                                                 
83 See, eg, Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], VI ZR 126/07, 22 January 2008, 
reported in [2008] NJW 1440. See also Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], 
VI ZR 186/88, 17 January1989, reported in [1989] NJW – Rechtsprechungsreport (NJW-RR), 
394 (cleaning of pathways in a housing area). 
84 See Gerhard Wagner in Säcker et al, Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, 
(C H Beck, 7th ed, 2017) vol 6 § 823 BGB paras 464–7. 
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or ought to have had, superior knowledge on some relevant aspect of health and 
safety in the particular industry; the subsidiary’s system of work was unsafe 
and the parent company knew this or ought to have known this; and the parent 
company knew or ought to have foreseen that the subsidiary or its employees 
would rely on the parent company using its superior knowledge for the 
employees’ protection.85 
The situation of a certification body that has been entrusted, for the sake of state 
benefits, with safety certification to the benefit of workers, has elements of both 
expert liability, as in Hedley Byrne and subsequent case law, and the Chandler 
v Cape situation. Certification bodies are entrusted with their work because they 
are experts in the relevant areas, including health and safety. Their task is to 
find out whether the subsidiary’s or supplier’s system of work is unsafe, and 
prevention of damage depends on their discovering unsafe elements and 
notifying their contracting partner of them. Although there has been no legal 
precedent to this effect, the situation appears to be well capable of attracting 
negligence liability due to the assumption of responsibility. This would surely 
seem to be ‘fair, just and reasonable’, if it is the state that calls for expert 
certification as a precondition to the receipt of state benefits, with the aim of 
protecting workers within the supply chain, or the neighbours of hazardous 
production sites. 
In contrast, no liability would arise where a social auditor is not entrusted with 
a particular task, as in the Canadian case of Das v George Weston.86 Victims of 
the Rana Plaza collapse had sued not only Loblaws, a Canadian company that 
had sourced garments from a factory in Rana Plaza, but also the certification 
organisation Bureau Veritas that had performed a ‘social audit’ for Loblaws in 
Rana Plaza. That ‘social audit’ did not include the assessment of the structural 
integrity of Rana Plaza, which would have been part of additional services for 
additional costs.87 This limitation was held to also limit Bureau Veritas’ duty 
of care.88 In fact, in oral hearings in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in 
this case, the defendant Bureau Veritas acknowledged that if it had negligently 
performed some service within the ambit of its social audit and an employee of 
the company it audited had been injured as a result, then Bureau Veritas would 
be exposed to liability.89 
                                                 
85 Chandler v Cape plc [2012] EWCA Civ 525 [80]. 
86 Das v George Weston Limited 2017 ONSC 4129. 
87 Ibid [53]. 
88 Ibid [446]. 
89 Ibid [444]. 
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C Private CSR Systems with Mandatory Certification 
Likewise, parent companies or traders may sign up to an existing private CSR 
standard that provides for mandatory certification, such as, for example, the 
Forest Stewardship Council standards or the SA8000 standard of Social 
Accountability International.90 The involvement of the certification 
organisation then becomes by itself a contractual duty owed by the parent 
company to the standardisation organisation. 
At the international level, private CSR systems are often substitutes for missing 
international legal instruments, and the standards that some of them have 
developed have been considered to be international standards, for example for 
the purposes of WTO law.91 Their setup sometimes comes close to national or 
EU scenarios in that the certification organisation is accredited by a private 
standard-setting organisation, needs to satisfy specific eligibility requirements 
and has to follow specific rules of operation as set up by the standard-setting 
organisation. One example would be the SA8000 system, under which certified 
organisations must provide a safe and healthy workplace environment92 and 
under which RINA had certified the Ali Enterprises factory in Karachi, 
Pakistan.93 
In the SA8000 system, all SA8000 audits are carried out by certification bodies 
that receive accreditation from Social Accountability International’s (SAI’s) 
independently managed affiliate, Social Accountability Accreditation Services 
(SAAS). The accreditation function encompasses oversight of auditors and the 
management systems of the auditing companies. SAI provides guidance on the 
Standard’s implementation and determines the program’s auditing 
methodology. SAAS assesses a certification body’s competence through a 
series of audits which review the management, processes, and auditor 
qualifications of the certification body’s certification process.94 
The certification body then evaluates the implementation of the accredited 
social system at a factory, farm or other organisation to ensure compliance with 
all elements of the system. This includes conducting mandatory unannounced 
                                                 
90 Social Accountability International, Social Accountability 8000 International Standard (June 
2014) 9 <www.sa-intl.org/_data/n_0001/resources/live/SA8000%20Standard%202014.pdf>. 
91 See Carola Glinski, ‘CSR and the Law of the WTO – The Impact of Tuna Dolphin II and EC–
Seal Products’ [2017] (1) Nordic Journal of Commercial Law 120, 143. 
92 See Social Accountability International, above n 90, especially part 3.1. 
93 Bureau Veritas and TÜV Rheinland have also been accredited by SA 8000. See the list of 
accredited certification bodies at <http://www.saasaccreditation.org/?q=node/65>. 
94 For details, various documents are available. See Social Accountability Accreditation Services, 
Document Library <http://www.saasaccreditation.org/document-library>. 
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audits. Interestingly, the number of unannounced audits varies, depending on 
the risk assessment for each country.95 Pakistan and Bangladesh are in the 
‘highest risk’ category and must be audited most frequently.96 
This is different from the situation discussed above in that that the state is not 
involved at all. 
1 German Law 
a) Contract with Protective Effect on Third Parties  As described 
in the previous section, the involvement of a certification organisation is 
voluntary, and the duties of the certification organisations are not defined by 
law or even endorsed by the state but have been set up by private 
standardisation organisations. Nevertheless, the institutional accreditation and 
control of the certification bodies and the composition of the private 
standardisation organisation as a multi-stakeholder organisation aims at the 
promotion of CSR including, in particular, responsibility to the workers in 
transnational production or supply chains. This makes it clear that the ‘real 
beneficiaries’ of the private systems are those workers (and other vulnerable 
groups). 
In the past, agreements between industry and trade unions or NGOs have often 
been seen as programmatic rather than as having legal effects.97 This has 
changed, not least due to the disasters at Ali Enterprises and Rana Plaza. Private 
systems that have been established as a reaction to such disasters, such as the 
Bangladesh Accord,98 or that have been revised to give them teeth, are 
voluntary only concerning participation but impose legally binding 
requirements on their participants. 
What remains is the question of whether, in such a situation, the parent 
company or trader and the certification organisation could agree to exclude the 
certification organisation’s liability towards third parties. At least in standard 
terms, such an agreement would not hold. Under § 309 no 8 a) BGB, a term 
                                                 
95 Social Accountability Accreditation Services, Unannounced SA8000 Audits <http://www. 
saasaccreditation.org/UnannouncedSA8000Audits>. 
96 Social Accountability Accreditation Services, WGI Ranking for SA8000 System <http://www. 
saasaccreditation.org/sites/default/files/u4/full_country_list_for_SA8000_risk_assessment_po
sted_to_web_2015.pdf>. 
97 See, eg, Sebastian Krebber, ‘Globalisierungsbedingter Verlust der Bindungswirkung 
staatlicher Regulierungen und die sich entwickelnden Alternativen’ [2008] (2) Europäische 
Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht 315. 
98 Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh (13 May 2013) <http://bangladesh 
accord.org/wp-content/uploads/the_accord.pdf>. 
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excluding liability for death or injury or limiting liability for death or injury to 
intentional and grossly negligent conduct is invalid. Moreover, it seems 
reasonable to argue that an exclusion clause would be contradictory to the very 
purpose of the contract and therefore be void (in relation to third parties that 
suffer harm). Instead, the parent company or trader and the certification 
organisation could agree on how they apportion liability between them, without 
effect on the claims of third parties. 
b) German Tort Law  Liability under § 823 paragraph 1 BGB would 
depend on the same circumstances as discussed above (IV.B.1.b), namely, the 
existence of a duty of care on the part of the parent company or buyer in a 
supply chain, and the (partial) delegation of that duty to the certification body. 
2 English Law 
With regard to English tort law, the question is again one of a duty of care of 
the certification body. In contrast to the previously discussed situations, there 
is no legal, or state-induced, background to the tasks of certification bodies 
within a privately organised system.  
English case law, however, suggests that legal duties can arise in such a context, 
as the case of Watson v British Boxing Board of Control99 shows. Michael 
Watson was a boxer who, on 21 September 1991, fought Chris Eubank under 
the supervision of the British Boxing Board of Control (BBBC), the British 
professional boxing governing body. The BBBC was a not-for-profit, private 
organisation, one of whose main concerns it was to promote safety standards in 
boxing. It had a series of rules on the medical coverage needed for boxing 
matches, which required two doctors to be present at all times. During the 
match, Watson was knocked out, and it was 7 minutes before doctors attended 
him. Eventually three doctors and an ambulance were needed. He was given no 
oxygen, and he was first sent to a hospital that lacked a neurosurgery unit. 
Watson spent 40 days in a coma and six years in a wheelchair. After recovering 
consciousness, he sued the BBBC, arguing that, because they laid down the 
rules governing professional boxing that were intended to ensure his safety, 
they owed him a duty of care and should have ensured that he was properly and 
immediately treated. 
Upholding the judgment of the High Court, the Court of Appeal held that there 
was sufficient proximity between the claimant and the BBBC to give rise to a 
duty of care. The BBBC was a body with specialist knowledge and gave 
advice to a defined class of persons in the knowledge that that class would 
                                                 
99 [2000] EWCA Civ 2116. 
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rely upon that advice in boxing contests. The claimant in fact relied on the 
board to exercise skill and care in its efforts to protect his safety during the 
fight. Furthermore, the claimant belonged to a class of persons within the 
contemplation of the defendant, and the defendant was involved in an 
activity over which it had complete control and which would be liable to result 
in injury if reasonable care were not exercised. 
Although certification systems, such as SA8000, are of course different from 
the activities of a sports body such as the BBBC, there are also similarities. In 
both cases the purpose of the system is, among other things, the health and 
safety of a defined class of persons — in the case of the certification system the 
employees of the companies that are certified — and both systems have 
mandatory rules, aimed at achieving their goals. In the case of certification, 
whereas the standardisation organisation lays down the rules, the certification 
bodies such as RINA or TÜV Rheinland play a crucial role in implementing 
them, and the whole system relies on problems being discovered and notified 
by the certification bodies. Thus, these monitoring bodies are responsible for 
injury to employees in the factories that they monitor if they fail to monitor the 
factories with reasonable care. This situation bears strong similarity to the role 
of notified bodies in EU product safety law.  
Overall, the step from previous case law to the imposition of liability on 
certification bodies within a mandatory certification scheme would not seem to 
be too great. Further, imposing liability on them would seem to be ‘fair, just 
and reasonable’ in terms of the three step test of Caparo v Dickman. 
D Entirely Voluntary Use of a Certification Body 
Parent companies or traders may decide entirely voluntarily to engage a 
certification organisation for support in the control of their subsidiaries or 
suppliers, for example, in order to impress customers with their CSR 
engagement. To that end, they may draw up their own set of requirements, 
compliance with which may then be controlled by the certification organisation. 
This was, for example, one of the business models of Bureau Veritas, as 
discussed in the above-mentioned case of Das v George Weston.100 
The decision to use certification voluntarily may, however, be based on a due 
diligence obligation on the parent company or trader, the fulfilment of which 
may be assisted by a certification body. 
                                                 
100 Das v George Weston Limited 2017 ONSC 4129 [444]. 
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As a prominent example, France has now introduced a statutory due diligence 
obligation with Loi n° 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de 
vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre [Law no 
2017-399 of 27 March 2017 relating to the Duty of Vigilance of Parent 
Companies and of Ordering Companies]. The draft law provided for both 
public law enforcement and the civil liability of parent companies that breach 
their due diligence obligations. However, the public law enforcement through 
fines has been declared unconstitutional by the Conseil consitutionnel [French 
Constitutional Court], due to the uncertainty of the meaning of terms such as 
‘human rights’, ‘fundamental freedoms’ or ‘reasonable care’.101 In contrast, 
civil liability has not been affected by that decision. The French law does not 
require certification of the corporation-wide system. Thus, the involvement of 
a certification organisation would be voluntary. Similar legislative projects or 
proposals have been put forward in Switzerland and Germany.102  
The due diligence duty of the parent company or buyer can also be taken on 
contractually, for example through an agreement with an NGO or a trade union 
or through the company or buyer signing up to a system such as the Bangladesh 
Accord. Under this Accord the signatories commit themselves to ‘the goal of a 
safe and sustainable Bangladeshi Ready-Made Garment (‘RMG’) industry in 
which no worker needs to fear fires, building collapses, or other accidents that 
could be prevented with reasonable health and safety measures’.103 
Finally, the parent company or buyer may itself be under a duty of care under 
the tort of negligence because it has assumed responsibility for the wellbeing 
of workers, as the Court of Appeal held in the case of Chandler v Cape. In the 
English case of Vedanta, the High Court and the Court of Appeal have 
indicated, in interim decisions concerning jurisdiction, that a parent company 
may be liable for damage arising from environmental pollution, in this case 
pollution resulting from the operation of a copper mine by a subsidiary.104 
                                                 
101 Conseil constitutionnel [French Constitutional Court], decision n° 2017-750 DC, 23 March 
2017 <https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/2017/2017750DC.htm>. 
102 In Switzerland, more than 80 NGOs, trade unions and shareholder unions have started an 
initiative; see Association Corporate Responsibility Initiative <http://konzern-initiative.ch>. 
For Germany, see Remo Klinger et al, Verankerung menschenrechtlicher Sorgfaltspflichten von 
Unternehmen im deutschen Recht (16 March 2016) <https://www.brot-fuer-die-
welt.de/fileadmin/mediapool/2_Downloads/Fachinformationen/Sonstiges/gutachten_sorgfalts
pflicht.pdf>. 
103 See the preamble to the Bangladesh Accord, above n 98. 
104 See Lungowe v Vedanta Resources plc [2016] EWHC 975 (TCC) [115]. 
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In the aftermath of Chandler v Cape, litigation against a buyer in a transnational 
supply chain was also started in Germany in the case of KiK (which is, however, 
to be assessed under the law of Pakistan), and the matter of corporate liability 
has also attracted broader attention in academic writing on German tort law. 
Initially, only a few academics argued in favour of corporation-wide 
organisation duties, including a duty of care for employees and neighbours of 
subsidiaries and even suppliers,105 whereas most authors were reluctant.106 
However, an increasing number of academic lawyers tend to advocate for the 
recognition of liability in the right circumstances.107 
The above issues are still unsettled, and this is not the place to enter into the 
debate. There is, however, a clear development towards parent companies 
bearing liability for the activities of their subsidiaries, and perhaps even of 
traders for their suppliers108 in the right circumstances. These circumstances 
include, in particular, a high level of control over the activities of subsidiaries 
or suppliers. 
In all these situations — that is, in the situation of a statutory or a contractual 
due diligence duty as well as in the situation of a duty of care under the tort of 
negligence — parent companies or buyers may be compelled to put an 
organisational structure in place that allows them to monitor their subsidiaries 
or suppliers on a regular basis. As these entities may be spread around the globe, 
it would seem to make sense to outsource that task to specialist organisations 
that operate in the relevant region. 
                                                 
105 For an early analysis, see Glinski, above n 71, 346. See also Miriam Saage-Maaß and Maren 
Leifker, ‘Haftungsrisiken Deutscher Unternehmen und ihres Managements für 
Menschenrechtsverletzungen im Ausland’ [2015] Betriebs-Berater (BB) 2499, 2502; Carola 
Glinski, ‘UN-Leitprinzipien, Selbstregulierung der Wirtschaft und Deliktsrecht: Alternativen 
zu verpflichtenden Völkerrechtsnormen für Unternehmen?’ in Krajewski, above n 82, 44, 67–
79. 
106 See Gehard Wagner, ‘Haftung für Menschenrechtsverletzungen [2016] 80 Rabels Zeitschrift 
für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht (RabelsZ) 717, 756–71; Marc-Philippe 
Weller, Luca Kaller and Alix Schulz, ‘Haftung deutscher Unternehmen für 
Menschenrechtsverletzungen im Ausland’ [2016] Archiv für civilistische Praxis (AcP) 216, 
387, 401–2. 
107 See now Marc-Philippe Weller and Chris Thomale, ‘Menschenrechtsklagen gegen deutsche 
Unternehmen’ [2017] Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht (ZGR) 509, 520–
3. 
108 On which see Peter Rott and Vibe Ulfbeck, ‘Supply Chain Liability of Multinational 
Corporations?’ (2015) 23 European Review of Private Law (ERPL) 415; Terwindt et al, above 
n 1, 276–95. 
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1 German Law 
a) Contract with Protective Effect on Third Parties  In the case of 
safety certification, it is obvious that action by the company which commissions 
certification in the interests of workers in the factories of subsidiaries or 
suppliers (that is, the parent company or the buyer in a supply chain) depends 
on the certification organisation’s detection and notification of unsafe 
conditions. Even if the fulfilment of a due diligence duty, or a duty of care 
towards employees or residents, does not require external certification, in other 
words even if it is left to the parent company or buyer to organise a system to 
implement the relevant standards, the involvement of a certification 
organisation will (objectively) serve the purpose of protecting the workers 
and/or residents as third parties to the certification contract. In other words, 
taking an objective approach, these workers and/or residents are the ‘real 
beneficiaries’ of the contract, as the certification contract is meant to ensure 
that certain safety conditions that the contracting company has imposed on or 
agreed with the subsidiary or supplier are met. 
The question under the doctrine of ‘contract with protective effect on third 
parties’ is, however, whether the parent company or trader in question is 
responsible for those workers. Such responsibility would trigger the protective 
effect of the contract between the parent company or trader and the certification 
organisation. This is where the abovementioned due diligence duties — derived 
from statute, from a contract, or from signing up to a system like the Bangladesh 
Accord, or simply from the tort of negligence through assumption of 
responsibility — come into play. 
Where no such duty of care exists on the part of the parent company or supplier, 
it seems difficult to argue that a duty of care arises on the part of the certification 
organisation. 
b) Tort Law  As mentioned above, a certification body could have a 
duty of care towards workers at, or neighbours of, a production site if its 
contracting partner delegated such a duty to the certification body. This is 
possible only if the contracting partner, thus the parent company or buyer in a 
supply chain, is under a duty of care towards workers at, or neighbours of, the 
production site in the first place. 
The delegation of the duty of care to an independent contractor (in this case the 
certification body) is normally based on a contract which, however, does not 
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even need to be valid, according to the established case law of the BGH.109 The 
tort law logic giving rise to the duty of care of the delegate is that, through 
delegating the duty of care, the delegator legitimately comes to rely on the 
delegate and therefore lowers his or her own attention.110 
The duty of care can also be partly delegated to an independent contractor.111 
This would be the case here, as the contractual arrangement between the parent 
company or buyer and the certification body normally requires the certification 
body to monitor certain aspects of CSR and to notify the parent company or 
buyer of deficiencies, while it remains for the parent company or buyer to then 
take action. 
A different question (and a side issue for the purposes of this article) is then 
whether or not the delegator also remains responsible for the damage, in 
particular in cases where the delegate breaches his or her duties negligently. 
According to established German case law, the delegator’s duty of care changes 
into the duty to select and monitor the delegate carefully. The extent to which 
the delegator has to monitor the delegate depends on the expertise of the 
delegate. If the latter is an expert, the delegator only needs to exercise control 
if there is an indication of unreliability or other shortcomings on the part of the 
expert.112 
As explained above, a duty of care of the certification organisation can be 
derived only from the duty of care of the parent company or of the buyer that 
commissions certification. If the parent company or buyer owes a duty of care, 
and if it organises its control system in such a way that a certification body takes 
over the task of visiting the production site and notifying the parent company 
or buyer of safety deficiencies, then the certification body partially takes over 
the duty of care and will be liable for damage resulting from negligence. 
                                                 
109 See Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], VI ZR 186/88, 17 January 1989, 
reported in [1989] NJW-RR 394, 395. 
110 See Wagner, above n 84, § 823 BGB para 467. 
111 See Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], VI ZR 44/92, 3 November 1992, 
reported in [1993] NJW-RR 346, with further references. See also Guido Christensen, 
Verkehrspflichten in arbeitsteiligen Prozessen (Peter Lang, 1995) 90–7. 
112 See, for example, Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], VI ZR 166/05, 26 
September 2006, reported in [2006] NJW 3628, 3629; Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal 
Court of Justice], VI ZR 369/12, 1 October 2013, reported in [2014] Neue Zeitschrift für 
Verkehrsrecht (NZV) 167, 169. 
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2 English Law 
The assessment under English law would again turn to Caparo v Dickman and 
the assumption of responsibility. Here, the situation appears to be somewhat 
different from that arising from a contract with protective effect on third parties, 
as the focus would seem to be more on the commitments of the certification 
organisation than on the interest of the parent company or buyer that 
commissions the certification. 
Still, the level of control that the parent company or buyer exercises over the 
production, and thus the extent to which a detection of risks to health and safety 
by a certification body would be able and necessary to mitigate those risks 
through the influence that the parent company or buyer can have on the 
producer, would seem to play an important role in the overall assessment of 
proximity. Thus, where the parent company, or the buyer, has control over the 
production to an extent that it owes the workers, or even neighbours, a duty of 
care, it seems possible that, by taking over risk assessment or monitoring duties, 
a certification body assumes responsibility for the health and safety of the 
workers. Again, the argument is that the task of the certification body is a 
crucial element of the control system of the parent company or buyer, and any 
breach of its duties increases the risk to workers at and neighbours of the 
production site. 
E CAUSATION AND STANDARD OF PROOF 
Under all possible grounds of liability, the claimants would have to show 
causation, that is, they would have to show that the detection and notification 
of the safety problem to the contracting partner (the parent company or the 
buyer in the supply chain) would have led to the remediation of the problem 
and therefore would have prevented the damage. 
The standard of proof differs between German law and English law. Whereas 
under English law the analysis is made on the balance of probabilities — 
whether it is more likely than not that the damage would have been prevented 
had detection and notification occurred113 — proof under § 286 of the German 
Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) involves the court having to decide whether or 
not it regards a fact as true. The BGH has specified that the finding does not 
have to be beyond doubt, but a degree of certainty is required that silences any 
doubts even if they cannot be completely eliminated.114 In practice, this means 
                                                 
113 See Miller v Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372. 
114 See Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], III ZR 139/67, 17 February 1970, 
reported in [1970] NJW 946. See also Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], 
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that German courts require probability that comes close to certainty. Thus, in 
the case of Elisabeth Schmitt, the first instance court had required the claimant 
to prove that the notified body, TÜV Rheinland, would have tested the silicone 
used at a particular time, and that at this time TÜV Rheinland would have 
detected that PIP was using industrial silicone.115 The appeal court reasoned 
similarly and required certainty that the industrial silicone would have been 
discovered during an unsolicited visit.116 
F CONCLUSION 
Certification bodies play a crucial role in assessing the risk of production and 
in discovering deficiencies, and even more so when it comes to production in 
developing countries of the Global South. They act, however, in a certain 
conflict of interest if they are paid by those that they are meant to control. 
Therefore, certification bodies need incentives to act in the best interest of those 
whose protection the certification exercise is meant to serve. 
In a public law system, certification bodies that do not live up to their duties 
may, in principle, be sanctioned through fines or the withdrawal of 
accreditation; although the PIP saga demonstrates that public law systems do 
not always work well. In private law systems, which prevail in the regulation 
of transnational supply chain, such sanctions are by and large unavailable. In 
both situations, tort liability can complement or substitute public law sanctions 
and provide an incentive for certification bodies to comply with their legal or 
contractual duties. 
This article has shown that under the right circumstances, certification bodies 
may owe a duty of care for the employees or even the neighbours of production 
sites. A duty of care owed by certification bodies has been confirmed in 
situations where the legal system expressly requires their involvement in 
safeguarding the health and safety of third parties, as recently illustrated in the 
PIP breast implant scandal. Such a duty of care should, however, also be 
assumed where certification bodies act within voluntary systems in which the 
state is involved, or in transnational private systems that are based on 
mandatory certification. Moreover, such bodies may come to owe a duty of care 
                                                 
VI ZR 221/92, 14 December 1993, reported in [1994] NJW-RR 567; Bundesgerichtshof 
[German Federal Court of Justice], IX ZR 311/95, 18 June 1998, reported in [1998] NJW 2969. 
115 See Landgericht Frankenthal [Frankenthal Regional Court], 6 O 304/12, 14 March 2013, 
reported in [2013] Medizinprodukterecht (MPR) 134. 
116 See Oberlandesgericht Zweibrücken [Zweibrücken Higher Regional Court], 4 U 66/13, 30 
January 2014, reported in [2014] MPR 62, 65. 
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by way of delegation from a parent company or buyer that itself is under a duty 
of care in relation to the health and safety of employees or neighbours of their 
subsidiaries or suppliers. 
Different legal systems may use different legal concepts to achieve this result, 
but they would all seem to be sufficiently open to reflect the increased role of 
certification bodies in global supply chains. It seems only a matter of time until 
the right cases reach the courts. 
